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Abstract: Future scenarios provide challenging, plausible and relevant stories about how 
the future could unfold. Urban Futures (UF) research has identified a substantial set (>450) 
of seemingly disparate scenarios published over the period 1997–2011 and within this 
research, a sub-set of >160 scenarios has been identified (and categorized) based on their 
narratives according to the structure first proposed by the Global Scenario Group (GSG) in 
1997; three world types (Business as Usual, Barbarization, and Great Transitions) and six 
scenarios, two for each world type (Policy Reform—PR, Market Forces—MF, 
Breakdown—B, Fortress World—FW, Eco-Communalism—EC and New Sustainability 
Paradigm—NSP). It is suggested that four of these scenario archetypes (MF, PR, NSP and 
FW) are sufficiently distinct to facilitate active stakeholder engagement in futures thinking. 
Moreover they are accompanied by a well-established, internally consistent set of 
narratives that provide a deeper understanding of the key fundamental drivers  
(e.g., STEEP—Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political) that could 
bring about realistic world changes through a push or a pull effect. This is testament to the 
original concept of the GSG scenarios and their development and refinement over a  
16 year period.  
Keywords: sustainability; future scenarios; scenario archetypes 
 
1. Introduction 
The publication of the 1987 Brundtland report, ‘Our Common Future’, by the World Commission 
on Environment and Development energized the concept of sustainable development and prompted the 
commitment of world leaders at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio to development that “meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
Undoubtedly these events helped place the sustainability agenda at the epicenter of national and 
international policy and research for the last 25 years. During this time it has been suggested that three 
dimensions are required to adequately address sustainability: ‘issues’ (i.e., the sustainability indicator 
spectrum from demographics to water); ‘space’ (i.e., international scale, different countries and 
regions); and ‘time’ (i.e., future generations, their needs and aspirations). ‘Urban Futures’ (UF) 
(www.urban-futures.org) is a 4-year EPSRC-funded project tasked with testing the resilience of 
today’s sustainability solutions through scenario-based research, considering a diverse range of issues 
(biodiversity, air quality, water, energy, underground infrastructure, built environment, density and 
decision making, organizational behavior and innovation, enterprise and social needs, aspirations and 
policy) within UK urban regeneration sites, assuming a time step of 40 years hence (the approximate 
length of time for a regeneration cycle). This paper is conceptual survey research which focuses on 
future scenarios. In this case future scenarios are not forecasts or predictions; they are plausible, 
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challenging and relevant stories about how the future may unfold [1–4]. The internally consistent 
descriptions/narratives used therein are determined by consideration of key drivers of  
change (e.g., STEEP—Social, Technological, Economic Environmental and Political) and provide a 
mix of qualitative and quantitative information that focuses upon aspects of greatest uncertainty and 
importance. This contrasts with scenario-building exercises which can be used as a practitioner tool in 
planning and community design contexts. In such cases a concise description (i.e., a vision) of what 
the world looks like at some future time is produced on which consensus for a preferred future state is 
drawn, and a full strategy developed.  
The first step of UF research was to identify and review existing futures studies (a forthcoming 
monograph by Hunt et al., [5] identified >450 distinct scenarios variants since 1997) and then establish 
whether a distinct set of archetypes exists. The starting point for this paper is to investigate (based on 
qualitative detailing) the robustness of a set of archetypes first proposed by the Global Scenarios 
Group (GSG) in 1997. Conclusions are drawn as to whether the GSG scenarios might be adopted and 
refined for UF research that is UK-based, rather than necessitating the derivation of yet another set of 
scenarios. 
1.1. Contextual History of GSG 
In 1991 collaboration between the Tellus Institute and the Stockholm Environment Institute explored 
the following high-level research questions as part of the PoleStar Project (www.polestarproject.org, [6]):  
1. What approaches and methods are appropriate for examining long-range socio-ecological 
prospects in a coherent and scientifically-grounded way?  
2. What policy adjustments in the near term are necessary to assure a vibrant and verdant 
civilization for the future?  
3. What are the implications for our values, behaviors, and lifestyles of taking seriously the 
concern for the well-being of people who are distant in space and time, and of the wider 
community of life with whom we share the biosphere? 
This research resulted in the development of the polestar system, a flexible tool for quantification of 
integrated alternative long-range scenarios at regional, national and global scales. As such, it was used 
to produce detailed data sets (parameters relevant to economy, society, resource use, and environment) 
which, combined with the richness of scenario narratives, provided a robust methodological 
framework for considering fundamental shifts in global development—including discontinuities and 
restructuring of socio-ecological systems [7]. To carry on this legacy the Global Scenario Group 
(GSG—www.gsg.org), an interdisciplinary and international group with a pedigree of conducting 
integrated scenario assessments, was assembled in 1995 by the Tellus Institute and Stockholm 
Environment Institute. In 1997 Gallopin and colleagues first proposed a set of three plausible, 
divergent world end-states [8]—referred to as Conventional, Great Transitions and Barbarization—to 
which a fourth was later added [9]: ‘Muddling through’—a passive majority (i.e., not pro-active) on 
the grand question of the global future. Over a five-year period, six scenario variants (Table 1) were 
subsequently defined, refined and checked repeatedly for internal consistency [10,11]. In addition, 
quantification of analyzed data (using the Polestar system) was made available in a Technical 
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document for four scenarios; MF, PR, NSP and FW, Table 1 [7], updated in 2009 using an additional 
10 years of data and an expanding literature on environmental, resource, and social developments [6]. 
Two others (EC and B) were not quantified, presumably because of their extreme nature. 
Table 1. Global Scenario Group (GSG) Scenarios: Four archetypal social visions for the 
future, adapted from [1]. 
World end-state Scenario variants Archetypal Social Visions  
‘Conventional’ 
Market Forces (MF) 
A world that evolves gradually, shaped by 
dominant driving forces 
Policy Reform (PR) 
A world that is influenced by a strong policy 
push for sustainability 
‘Great 
Transitions’ 
New Sustainability Paradigm (NSP) A world where new human values and new 
approaches to development emerge Eco-Communalism (EC) 
‘Barbarization’ 
Fortress world (FW) A world that succumbs to fragmentation, 
environmental collapse, and institutional failure Breakdown (B) 
In 2005 Raskin (president of Tellus) compared GSGs’ visions of the future with five other  
well-reported scenario studies, WBCSD [12], OECD, [13–15], IPCC [16], UNEP [17,18] and  
WWV [19,20], and suggested that a common set of four archetypes could be found [21] (Table 1). 
Further mapping exercises have since been conducted, resulting from the development of yet more 
scenarios [22–32]. By combining this prior knowledge from the literature and adding in further 
scenario variants (based on qualitative details given within scenario narratives), a substantially increased 
evidence-base is provided herein to support the hypothesis that the world-end states (and scenario 
variants) first proposed by GSG continue to form a distinct set of archetypes (Section 2). The legacy of 
these GSG scenario variants are subsequently discussed in the context of providing a distinct set of 
archetypes relevant to anyone considering scenario-based studies (Section 3). Conclusions are 
subsequently drawn regarding the credibility of archetypes drawn from the GSG work (Section 4).  
2. Comparing GSG Scenarios Variants with those from the Literature 
In this section each GSG scenario variant is outlined within the three world end-states. Aligned to 
each GSG scenario variant are observations from the literature (shown in Bold in Table 2) that identify 
similarities with other scenario based studies and additional similarities that have been identified 
during this review (shown in italics in Table 2) Scenarios that fall under more than one category are 
listed under each. 
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Table 2. Scenarios grouped by GSG archetypes 1997–2011 (Bold—as described within the literature, Italics—additions from this research). 
CONVENTIONAL  GREAT TRANSITIONS BARBARIZATION 
 (MF) [21]  (PR) [21]  (NSP) [21]  (EC) [21]  (FW) [21] (B) [21] 
FROG [12] 
Business as Usual [19,81] 
Reference [14,15] 
A1 [16] 
Markets First [17,18] 
Economy First [34] 
Global Orchestration [54] 
Big is Beautiful [112] 
Global Economy [78,90] 
Great Escape [77] 
World Markets [22,23,39,40,56, 
58,59,60,67,68,79,83] 
Market World [11,42] 
Beta [27] 
Jeopardy [51] 
Blinkered Evolution [43] 
New Frontiers [28] 
Market Forces [25] 
Business as usual [30] 
Free Markets [30] 
Riding the Tiger [44] 
Triumphant Markets [45] 
World Markets [83] 
High Growth (F-0) [46] 
GO for GROWTH [31] 
Growing on [57] 
Perpetual Motion [81] 
Carry on Consuming [48] 
Economy First [34,35] 
Bazaar [49] 
High Emissions [50]  
Market Forces [51] 
Uncontrolled Demand [52] 
GEOpolity [12] 
Technology, Economics  
& the private sector [19]  
Policy variants [14,15] 
B1 [16] 
Policy First [17,18] 
Global sustainability [22,39, 
40,58,59,60,67,68,79,81,83]  
Technogarden [54] 
Knowledge is King [112] 
Big Crisis [77] 
Strong Europe [80] 
Global Co-operation [78] 
Policy Rules [34,35] 
Alchemy [51] 
Global commons [23] 
Gamma [27] 
Green World [42] 
Strong government [28] 
Fruits for a few [28] 
SUCCEED through 
SCIENCE [31] 
Green policy [30] 
Technocratic [30] 
Policy reform [25] 
Leading the way [55]  
Prosperous-Stewardship [56] 
Urban Colonies [81] 
 Low emissions [50] 
Innovation [51] 
Business as usual (F-1) [46] 
Powerdown [57] 
Jazz [12] 
Values and Lifestyles [19] 
 Sustainability First [17,18] 
Restoration [51] 
Sustainable Behavior [51] 
Global Sustainability [22,39, 
40,58,59,60,67,68,79,83]  
Global Responsibility [41] 
B1 [16] 
Green World [42] 
Living on the No.8 wire [28] 
Civic Renewal [43] 
CONNECT for LIFE [31] 
Global Orchestration [54] 
Global Commons [23] 
Great Transitions [25] 
Sustainable world [30] 
Hearts [61] 
The Triple Whammy [62] 
Factor Four [46] 
 
Sustainability First [17,18] 
B2 [16] 
Local stewardship [22,39, 
40,58,59,60,67,68,79,81,83]  
Delta [27] 
Transformed World [11] 
Adapting Mosaic [54] 
Survivor [51] 
Local Resilience [51] 
Tribal Trading [81] 
Independent Aotearoa [28] 
Eco-Communalism [30] 
Blueprints [82] 
Lettuce Surprise U [77] 
Evolved Society [77] 
Regional Communities [78] 
Sustainability Eventually [34,35] 
Building Lifeboats [57] 
Medium/Low Emissions [50] 
 
 
Security First [17,18] 
Fortress Europe [34] 
Fortress World [11,25,30] 
A2 [16] 
National Enterprise [39 
41,59,60,68,83] 
Regional- 
Stewardship [65] 
Order from Strength [54] 
Scramble [54,82] 
Clustered Networks [77] 
Transatlantic Market [80] 
Continental Markets [54,78] 
 Fortress Britain [23] 
Provincial Enterprise [22, 
40,58,67,79,81]  
Medium/Low 
-emissions [50] 
Alpha [27] 
Fortress Europe [34,35,42]  
Technogarden [54] 
Lords of Misrule [22] 
Rivers [35] 
Turbulent Neighborhoods [45] 
Boom and Blame [69] 
Last Man Standing [57] 
Brown Tech [70] 
KEEP it LOCAL [31] 
 
 
A2 [16] 
Diamonds [61] 
Decline to Disaster [72] 
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2.1. Conventional Worlds 
The first GSG scenario variant within the conventional world archetype is ‘Market forces—MF’. 
‘MF is constructed as a future in which free market optimism remains dominant and proves  
well-founded [33]’. ‘Market-driven globalization, trade liberalization, institutional 
modernization—relies centrally on the self-correcting logic of competitive markets to address 
global challenges [21].’ Populations and the global economy expand and free trade and 
deregulation drive growth. The availability of sufficient resources—raw materials, land, water, 
energy—and the means of maintaining ecological resilience in such a huge economy are critical 
uncertainties. The challenge of satisfying bio-physical sustainability constraints is compounded 
by the challenge of maintaining social and economic sustainability in a world of profound 
inequalities between rich and poor countries, and within each country [33]’. 
‘Market Forces’ was originally referred to as a ‘Reference’ or ‘Business-As-Usual’ scenario [8,10]. 
The name ‘Market forces’ came later [6,9,11] and illustrates the need for a generic worldwide 
application for each world end-state. Whilst MF may be based upon historical patterns and  
business-as-usual for the future in the U.S. [6], it may not be a fair representation for a reference 
scenario everywhere.  
Within the literature there are numerous scenarios aligning with the MF variant. Raskin [21] first 
suggested that the MF scenario was broadly similar to:  
 First Raise Our Growth—FROG!—a familiar world where economic growth and success is a 
major concern and where human social systems are unable to meet the challenge of sustainable 
development, [12];  
 ‘Business as usual’—a continuation and extrapolation of current trends with limited investment 
in water infrastructure, [19];  
 ‘Reference’—a market forces approach based on current UN predictions, [13–15];  
 ‘A1’—an integrated unsustainable world of very rapid economic growth [16], and 
  ‘Markets First’—a world based upon market driven developments [17,18] (later developed to 
‘Economy First’ [34,35], in which Globalization and Liberalization are embraced, economic 
growth is high and multinational companies dictate environmental standards, the close 
relationship being shown in Figure 1b).  
The compatibility between ‘A1’ and ‘FROG’ has been recognized previously by Morita  
et al. [36], and the strong links between ‘A1’ and ‘Markets first’ have been reinforced by numerous  
authors [23,24,26,32,37,38], based upon both having a strong global-economic-self-interest/reactive 
focus, a commonality shared by many of the scenarios described herein (Figures 1a,b and 2). As such, 
‘Great escape’ and ‘Global economy’ can also be added to the list. Table 3 shows qualitative patterns 
for some of the previously mentioned scenarios according to a range of key drivers from where direct 
alignment with MF can be seen. 
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Figure 1. (a) 10 Scenario studies on two axes of uncertainty, modified from [26,32];  
(b) Approximate location of selected scenarios, modified from [34,35]. 
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Figure 2. Various scenarios plotted against Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) 
axes, modified from [24]—scenario sets are identified by matching shapes/text.  
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Table 3. Qualitative patterns of change in Market Forces (MF) according to Social, 
Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political (STEEP) drivers. 
 Society Technology Economy Environment Policies 
Performance  
in MF [6] 
Worsens 
 
Slight 
improvement    
Strengthens 
significantly 
Worsens 
 
 
Weak 
 
Generic 
qualitative 
patterns of 
change that 
resonate with 
other scenario 
sets 
Emphasis on 
individuals,  
low public 
participation in 
governance. 
Uncontrolled 
urbanization and 
an increasing 
ageing 
population. A 
consumerist 
world where the 
rich get richer. 
The focus is on 
economic 
efficiency. 
However, access 
depends on what 
you can pay for. 
Innovative 
technologies 
respond to 
consumer 
demands. 
Strongest 
economy with 
International 
decision-making. 
However there is 
low government 
intervention in a 
highly efficient 
formal economy 
in which most 
people work. 
Environment 
worsens due to 
high 
environmental 
impacts. Increase 
in pollutants, 
CO2 emissions, 
resource 
use/capita and 
water stress 
(quality and 
quantity of 
groundwater 
decrease). Net 
deforestation. 
Weak social and 
environmental 
policies. 
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Pridmore [22] has previously suggested a close alignment between ‘A1’ and ‘World Markets’, e.g., 
they are similar to the present day USA [39], with consumerist values, global governance and 
declining manufacturing and agriculture [23,40,41]. The close relationship with MF is illustrated in 
Figure 3 [30] and is confirmed by Pinnegar et al. [23], with the addition of ‘Market world’ [42],  
‘Beta’ (An early version of EA’s ‘Jeopardy’ scenario), and ‘Global Orchestration’ (although the last 
of these has not been added to the list as it resonates more evidently with NSP (Section 2.1)). Around 
the same time EA [27] reported close links between ‘World Markets’ (previously linked to many other 
MF type scenarios) and their ‘Jeopardy’ scenario (an intensive materialistic consumerist culture, 
coupled with high economic growth, growing social fragmentation and a continuing reliance on fossil-
based fuels [27], a scenario upon which ‘Blinkered Evolution’ (a world where mainstream behaviour is 
committed to an individualized consumption paradigm [43]) was based. Taylor et al. [28] confirms 
many of these relationships and further suggests close resemblance between ‘Market Forces’, a 
scenario based directly on the work of GSG that assumes economic growth paradigms, based on the 
experience of developed countries, are appropriate for the rest of the world [25], and their ‘New 
Frontiers’ scenario. This is not surprising given the references therein to market competition, individual 
meritocracy and unfettered consumption, as well as education and health for those that can afford it.  
Figure 3. GSG scenarios within the Foresight Futures 2020 plane [30]. 
INTERDEPENDENCE
AUTONOMY
COMMUNITYINDIVIDUAL 
PR
NSP
FW 
Current 
Situation
MF 
World 
Markets 
National 
Enterprise    EC
Global 
Sustainability 
(Notional)  
time axis 
Local 
Stewardship 
 
Several additions have been made to this list based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core 
values to MF:  
 ‘Riding the Tiger’—a linear continuation of the current era [44];  
 ‘Triumphant Markets’—a world of materialism, consumerism, free trade and market 
integration, [45];  
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 ‘World markets’—where material wealth and greater mobility is to the detriment of society and 
the environment [43];  
 ‘High growth (F-0)’—a throw away economy with a free market model [46]; 
  ‘Go for Growth’—where economic growth continues to be driven by consumption and new 
technology [31];  
 ‘Growing on’—where high economic growth is at the expense of social cohesion and 
environmental sustainability [39];  
 ‘Perpetual Motion’—a society driven by constant information, consumption and competition 
[47];  
 ‘Carry on consuming’—where UK supply chains are dominated by a handful of companies and 
global competition has put greater reliance on production and processing within the European 
region [48];  
 ‘Bazaar’—a market world where free market policies, corporate restructuring and 
entrepreneurship offer a model for the rest of the world [49];  
 ‘High emissions’—contributing to high environmental impacts[50];  
 ‘Market Forces’—in this scenario the Environment Agency focus on growth, consumerism and 
high water demand [51] it is not surprising that this has been rebranded as ‘uncontrolled 
demand’ [52], a significant concern in the water field. 
The second scenario within the conventional archetype is ‘Policy reform—PR’.  
The PR path requires unprecedented political will for establishing the necessary regulatory, 
economic, social, technological, and legal mechanisms [33]. This strong policy is used to meet 
social and environmental sustainability goals following widespread concern over environmental 
deterioration, social conflict, and economic instability. This leads to a marshalling of political 
will to implement comprehensive government action aimed at redirecting and constraining the 
global economy to achieve a broad set of social and environmental goals [21]. PR assumes the 
emergence of a massive government-led effort to achieve sustainability without major changes in 
the state-centric international order, modern institutional structures, and consumerist  
values [33]. For example PR is assumed to have adopted the best available technologies and yet 
behaviour has remained relatively unchanged [6]. There is a deep and widespread commitment 
to economic equity and strong and harmonized policies are implemented that, by redirecting the 
world economy and promoting technological innovation, are able to achieve internationally 
recognized goals for poverty reduction, climate change stabilization, ecosystem preservation, 
freshwater protection, and pollution control [33].  
Raskin [21] first suggested that PR was broadly similar to:  
 Global Ecosystem Organization—‘GEOpolity’—a world where an environmental and social 
crisis looms and the response is to build an interlocking governance structure coordinated at the 
international level, [12];  
 ‘Technology, Economics and the private sector’—where private sector initiatives lead research 
and development, and globalization drives economic growth, but the poorest countries are left 
behind [19];  
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 ‘Policy variants’—Decarbonization is a major theme in this world, prompted by a carbon 
market in which all goods and services carry a carbon price [13–15];  
 ‘B1’—world that emphasizes global solutions to economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability with reductions in material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-
efficient technologies [16] , and  
 ‘Policy First’—where strong actions are undertaken by governments in an attempt to reach 
specific social and environmental goals, [17,18]; developed to ‘Policy Rules’ where Europe is 
at the forefront of a new socio-economic paradigm of public/private partnerships and leads a 
global shift in direction, water framework directive compliance is higher than ever—the close 
relationship can be seen in Figure 1 [34,35].  
The compatibility between ‘B1’ and ‘GEOpolity’ has been recognized previously by  
Morita et al. [35] whilst correspondence between PR, ‘B1’ and ‘Policy first’ is reinforced by  
numerous authors [18,23,26,37,38]. In terms of high global-environmental-solidarity/pro-active 
considerations (Figures 1a,b, and 2) very close compatibility is reported between ‘B1’ and ‘Global 
sustainability’ [22,24]. This view is upheld by Busch [26] and Kok et al. [32] with the addition of the 
following: ‘Technogarden, Knowledge is King, Big Crisis, Strong Europe and Global Co-operation’. 
As ‘Global Sustainability’ and ‘B1’ align with both PR and NSP, albeit more strongly in NSP, they 
appear in both lists (Table 2). Table 4 shows close alignment of previously-mentioned scenarios to PR 
when considering qualitative patterns of change according to a range of key drivers [26].  
Table 4. Qualitative patterns of change in Policy Reform (PR) according to STEEP 
drivers.  
 Society Technology Economy Environment Policies 
Performance  
in PR [6] 
Improvement 
 
 
 
Significant 
Improvement 
 
 
Strengthens 
 
 
 
Improvement 
 
 
 
Strong 
 
 
 
Generic 
qualitative 
patterns of 
change that 
resonate with 
other scenario 
sets 
Emphasis on 
more 
community. 
Medium public 
participation in 
governance. 
Less chaotic 
urbanization and 
a growing 
population. User 
behaviors 
relatively 
unchanged. 
Focus on general 
efficiency and 
environment. 
Promotion of 
technology transfer 
and diffusion. Best 
practice technology. 
Dependence on 
increases in 
technological 
efficiency to reduce 
consumption. 
Strong economic 
growth with 
International 
decision making. 
High government 
intervention in an 
efficient and fair 
formal economy in 
which most people 
work. 
Environment 
improves due to 
reduced 
environmental 
impacts. Reduction in 
Pollutants, CO2 
emissions (20% of 
1990 levels reached 
by 2050), resource 
use/capita and water 
stress. Moderately 
reduced deforestation. 
Strong social 
and 
environmental 
policies 
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Whilst Makropoulos et al. [30] suggest that PR is on the way to NSP, Raskin [53] argues that the 
transition very much depends upon where branch points [8] might form. Pinnegar et al. [23] have 
aligned ‘B1’ with ‘Global commons’ (where people aspire to high levels of welfare and a sound 
environment, and international co-operation towards global sustainability [23]); ‘Gamma’ (An early 
version of EA’s ‘Alchemy’ scenario); ‘Green World’ [42] and ‘Technogarden’ (where Global markets 
in ecological property combine green technology, eco-efficiency, openness and competition [54]), 
which the Environment Agency suggests has similarities to their ‘Alchemy’ scenario (where a new 
regulatory environment spurs innovation in new technologies and new standards of producer 
responsibility [51]). Defra also noted similarities between ‘Alchemy’ and their own ‘Strong 
government’ scenario [43] (the latter built upon the former). Both ‘Alchemy’ and ‘Technogarden’ have 
been linked to Natural England’s ‘SUCCEED through SCIENCE’ scenario [31] (where the global 
economy continues to be driven by innovation and everyone relies on business to keep the country 
growing), as shown in Figure 4. The ‘Green Policy’ (where ecologists influence central policy) and 
‘Technocratic’ scenarios (where public engineers and technocrats influence policy) as proposed by 
Makropoulos et al. [30] are very much policy-related and therefore not dissimilar to PR. In ‘Policy 
reform’ (a scenario in which negative impacts of market mechanisms are tempered by the inclusion of 
mitigation programs) it is argued that the socio-economic and political considerations may make it 
expedient for governments to take actions that favor citizens, rather than wait for the operation of the 
market to correct these ills [25]. As this is drawn directly on the work of GSG the direct comparison 
with PR is unavoidable.  
Several additions have been made to this list based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core 
values to PR:  
 ‘Leading the way’—UK Government takes a hands on approach to ensure the transition to a 
low-carbon economy; investment in environmental research and technology is high [55];  
 ‘Prosperous stewardship’—a global player in economic terms with high regulation, innovation 
and a dry climate [56];  
 Urban Colonies—good environmental practice is at the heart of the UK’s economic and social 
policies; new urban planning policies; consumption has fallen; resource use is now a 
fundamental part of the tax system and disposable items are less popular [47]; 
 ’ Low emissions’—resulting in reduced environmental impacts [50]; 
  Innovation—Previously Alchemy, in this world people work in regulation and compliance; 
environmental concerns are the problem of manufacturers and service providers — supply side 
regulation (for water) is an accepted integral part of the economy [52];  
 ‘Business as usual—B-A-U’ describes strict controls for land-use planning, a balance between 
growing volumes and increasing recycling rates, and adoption of techno-fixes for carbon 
capture [46]—as such it describes perfectly a policy-centric B-A-U for the UK; and  
 ‘Powerdown’—refers to the path of self-limitation, cooperation and sharing; an orderly 
equitable transition to a low-carbon economy, which mirrors the steps being taken within a PR 
world [57]. 
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Figure 4. Archetypes by theme clusters (Bold text shows scenarios included in this study), modified from [31]. 
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2.2. Great Transitions 
The first variant within the great transitions archetype is ‘New Sustainability Paradigm—NSP’.  
NSP sees new humane globalization (rather than localism) change the character of urban 
industrial society [21]. A values-led change catalyzed by the push of deepening crises and the 
pull of desire for a just, sustainable, and planetary civilization. This new paradigm is rooted in 
human solidarity, universal access to education and health care services, ecological resilience, 
reduced consumerism (technology is as good as it gets but matched also by a step-change in 
behavior [6]), improved well-being, e.g., creativity, leisure, relationships, and community 
engagement) and quality of life [33]. NSP is a more cosmopolitan vision than EC, because it is a 
world that would transcend and transform urban and industrial civilization, and maintain global 
linkages and solidarity, rather than retreat into localism [10]. The improved social cohesion 
reduces conflict; crises may still linger, but the world is able to confront them with enhanced 
institutions for reconciliation and cooperation [33]. 
Raskin [21] first suggested that this scenario is broadly similar to: 
 Jazz—where markets are harnessed for finding solutions to sustainable development [12];  
 Values and Lifestyle—Sustainable development, with an emphasis on research and development 
in the poorest countries [19,20], and  
 Sustainability First—a world in which a new development paradigm emerges in response to the 
challenge of sustainability, supported by new, more equitable values and institutions [17,18].  
According to the Environment Agency this scenario is also very similar to their ‘Restoration’ scenario 
(a world where societal values and behavior are oriented more towards sustainable development goals 
as a result of greater awareness and perception of environmental risk [51]—subsequently renamed to 
‘Sustainable Behavior’ [52]). They also suggest similarity with Foresights ‘Global Sustainability’ 
scenario, (e.g., that it is similar to the Netherlands [39]) also known as ‘Global responsibility’ [41,58], 
a world with: a strong index of sustainable economic welfare and climate management, conservationist 
values (biodiversity is stable), global governance, renewable energy, less resource-intensive 
manufacturing, equity, and improved air and water quality [59,60]. Previously, Pridmore [22] suggested 
a closer alignment between ‘Global sustainability’ and ‘B1’ [16], based upon a strong  
global-environmental focus, this relationship being confirmed by de Vries [24] in Figure 2. Hence, the 
subtle similarities with ‘Green World’ (aligned previously with PR) cannot be ignored. Table 5 shows 
the close alignment of a number of the scenarios aligned under NSP, according to key drivers [26]. 
Taylor et al. [28] suggest that some elements (i.e., restorative stages) of their ‘Living on the  
No.8 Wire’ scenario (where New Zealand reacted too late to sustainability challenges and got left 
behind globally, but social cohesion has permitted an indigenous and inventive subsistence in the 
economy, as seen in other Pacific Islands) resonate well with ‘Restoration’ (mentioned earlier). This in 
turn is assumed by Defra [43] to closely resemble their ‘Civic renewal’ scenario (a world where British 
citizens and consumers, rather than British politicians, begin to change their behavior—this being a 
strong characteristic that resonates well within NSP).  
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As can be seen in Figure 4, Natural England align their ‘CONNECT for LIFE’ scenario (where 
people now connect through vast global networks [31]) with ‘Global Orchestration’ (a world of 
sustainable development, economic growth, fair trade, global public health, global education, global 
NGO and multilateral organizations [54]).  
Table 5. Qualitative patterns of change in New Sustainability Paradigm (NSP) according 
to STEEP drivers. 
 Society Technology Economy Environment Policies 
Performance 
in NSP [6] 
 
Significant 
improvement 
 
 
Significant 
improvement 
 
 
Strengthens 
 
 
Significant 
improvement 
 
 
Strong 
 
 
Generic 
qualitative 
patterns of 
change that 
resonate with 
other 
scenario sets 
Strongest emphasis 
on community. 
Highest public 
participation in 
governance. Large 
reduction in 
population. 
Significant 
voluntary 
Improvement to 
user behavior. 
Best practice 
technology [6]. 
Focus on general 
efficiency and 
environment. 
Promotion of 
Technology transfer 
and diffusion, 
encouragement of 
open source. 
Sustainable 
economic 
growth with no 
dominant scale 
for decision 
making. Place 
of work is 
variable by 
region and 
societal group. 
Lowest pressure on 
natural 
environment. 
Greatest reduction 
in pollutants, CO2 
emissions, resource 
use/capita and 
water stress. Net 
reforestation. 
Strongest social 
and 
environmental 
policies. Human 
well-being and 
the environment 
are central to 
long-term 
planning 
initiatives. 
In addition it is closely related to ‘Global Sustainability’ (mentioned previously), ‘Sustainability 
First’ (mentioned previously) and ‘Global commons’ (a world where people aspire to high levels of 
welfare and a sound environment—driven through International co-operation towards global 
sustainability [23]). It is interesting to note that ‘Sustainability First’, whilst being  
environmentally-focused, provides a balance between global and regional (i.e., spanning somewhere 
between NSP and EC), although its position is best described by Figure 1b rather than 2. ‘Great 
Transitions’ is a world in which the three pillars of sustainable development are strengthened and 
behavioral patterns that characterize modern societies, such as consumerism, give way. As such a new 
level of satisfaction that is not materialistic is defined [25]. It is worth noting that de Vries [24] locates 
‘Great transitions’, a combination of EC and NSP as defined by Hammond (1997), in the lower  
right-hand quadrant in Figure 2; however, when NSP is disassociated from EC within this archetype, 
the former would move vertically upwards (into the upper quadrant) whereas the latter would move 
marginally downwards. Macropoulos et al. [30] align their ‘Sustainable world’ (a world where 
integrated solutions are the aim) directly with NSP, as it draws narratives from this research.  
Several additions have been made to this list, based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core 
values to NSP, these are:  
 ‘Hearts’—Environment wins, Society Wins—This is a world in which demography, politics, 
economics, and sustainability gel. It is the future that the Brundtland Commission pointed us 
towards [61];  
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 ‘Triple Whammy’—based upon a combined approach to environmental, social and economic 
sustainability [62]; and 
 ‘Factor Four’—a more sustainable, low-impact food system that improves significantly 
demand-side management in addition to re-use, recycling and composting [46].  
The second scenario within the great transition world is ‘Eco-communalism—EC’.  
Eco-communalism envisions a patchwork of semi-isolated and self-reliant communities; quite 
sustainable with high equity, low economic growth, low populations [8,63] with a bio-regional 
focus, a highly localist vision and face-to-face democracy, [21]. EC contrasts with NSP by: 
embracing the principles of strong decentralization; small-scale technology; and economic 
autarky [10]. It has been suggested by Gallopin et al. [8] that an EC world could emerge out of 
an NSP world, if powerful consensus arose for localism, diversity and autonomy. Just as likely, 
however, it could emerge from the recovery of Breakdown [8]. A major threat to sustainability 
could come from the possibility that some of the more or less isolated communities develop into 
aggressive, expansionist forces that attempt to dominate neighboring communities [8]. 
Raskin [21] first suggested that this scenario is broadly similar to: 
 ‘B2’ [16], which de Vries [24], in Figure 1, aligns closely with:  
 ‘Local stewardship’—a world with conservative values, regional/national governance,  
locally-based financial and other services, and small-scale intensive agriculture and 
manufacturing [41,59,60]—like Denmark, Sami [39] —  this relationship being confirmed by 
Pridmore [22], EA [51] and Pinnegar et al. [23], the last of these authors include also:  
 ‘Delta’—an early version of EA’s ‘Survivor’ scenario, and:  
 ‘Adaptive Mosaic’—a world of local regional co-management; common property institutions; 
integration of local rules regulating trade; local, non-market rights; local communities; local 
equity and cooperatives [54].  
The Environment Agency suggested similarities between their ‘Survivor’ scenario (a scenario in 
which the consumers become more frugal and self-reliant with resurgence in traditional regional and 
local cultures and values [51] — subsequently renamed to ‘Local Resilience’ [52]) and Foresight’s 
‘Tribal Trading’ scenario (a world shrunk to their own community, a global economic system that is 
severely damaged with infrastructure falling into disrepair, local food production and services and 
local transport - typically by bike and horse. There are local conflicts over resources: lawlessness and 
mistrust are high. The state does what it can—but its power has been eroded [47]). Landcare 
Associates suggest that some elements of their ‘Independent Aotearoa’ scenario (also known as the 
‘Shire’) were broadly similar to ‘Tribal Trading’: the link to EC is easily recognized given the 
references to a world that has international geopolitical instability, strong social cohesion and a 
voluntary disconnect from globalization. In other words, as Taylor describes it: equitable, educated, 
environmental—friendly and dull. Macropoulos et al. [30] align their ‘Eco-communalism’ (green 
visions of bioregionalism, localism, face to face democracy, small technology and economic autarky) 
directly with EC. From Figure 1a, b other scenarios include: Blueprints, Lettuce surprise U, Evolved 
Society, Regional Communities and Sustainability eventually (a world where water demand has 
structurally decreased, derived from ‘Sustainability First’ [34,35]).  
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During this research the following additions have been made to this list, based on the adoption of 
similar descriptors and core values to EC:  
 ‘Building lifeboats’—the path of community, solidarity and preservation [57] and  
 ‘Medium/Low emissions’ [50]. 
2.3. Barbarization 
The first scenario within the barbarization archetype is ‘Fortress World—FW’. 
Authoritarian rule, elites in “fortresses”, poverty & repression outside; an authoritarian 
response to the threat of breakdown; from protected enclaves, elites control an impoverished 
majority and manage critical natural resources [9,10,33] Strategic mineral reserves, freshwater 
and important biological resources are put under military control, as are favored resort areas, 
including nature and hunting preserves, from which the poor are excluded [8]. This is a world in 
which wealth, resources and conventional governance systems are eroding and alliances are 
formed to protect the privileges of rich and powerful elites in their bubbles of privilege. Outside 
the fortress, the majority is mired in poverty, denied access to scarce resources and restricted in 
mobility, expression and basic rights [8]. Authorities employ geo-engineering techniques to 
stabilize the global climate, while dispatching militia to multiple hotspots in an attempt to quell 
social conflict and mass migration. But the results are mixed: emergency measures and spotty 
infrastructure investment cannot keep pace with habitat loss and climate change; inadequate 
food and water to desperate billions [33]. Technology is maintained in the fortresses, even with 
some continued innovation, but deteriorates elsewhere. Local pollution within the fortress is 
reduced through increased efficiency and recycling. Pollution is also exported outside the 
enclaves, contributing to the extreme environmental deterioration induced by the unsustainable 
practices of the desperately poor and by the extraction of resources for the wealthy [8]. In this 
kind of future, sustainable development is not in the cards, a half-remembered dream of a more 
hopeful time [33]. Global equity is very low, though it could be high within the fortress, and 
outside. For those unfortunate enough to be born poor, life is Hobbesian: nasty, brutish, and 
short. A general uprising of the excluded population is plausible and the collapse of FW could 
lead to Breakdown [8,23,53]. 
Raskin [21] suggested that this scenario was broadly similar to:  
 GEO’s ‘Security First’ scenario is a world of great disparities, where inequality and conflict 
prevail, brought about by socio-economic and environmental stresses [17,18];  
 GEO-4, 2008, this was developed by Duel et al. [35] into ‘Fortress Europe’ as shown in  
Figure 1b; a world in which Europe closes its borders and concentrates on a series of security 
issues, a central goal of which is self-sufficiency; co-operation is are difficult, alliances change 
and water conflicts intensify) and  
 AEO’s ‘Fortress World’ scenario, the later being developed from the former [25].  
The last of these scenarios has been linked directly to ‘A2’ (A high regional-economic focus [16] by 
de Vries [24], in addition to ‘Barbarization’ which includes FW and B [11] (see Figure 2).  
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It can be seen that ‘Security First’ is the least localized of the scenarios considered under FW, thus 
far—economics being broadly similar in each case. The reference to ‘clash of civilizations’ [64] in 
Figure 2, is understandable given the context of a world in which global affairs and interactions are 
between “civilizations” rather than nation-states. Table 6 [26] shows the close alignment of a number 
of scenarios under NSP according to key drivers, these relationships being confirmed by Zurek [37] 
and Westhoek et al. [38]. 
‘Fortress World’, as derived by Makropoulos et al. [30], is based upon narratives drawn from FW 
and therefore shows considerable similarities: e.g., environmental conditions that deteriorate rapidly; 
pollution; climate change; and ecosystems degradation that interact and amplify the crisis. The links 
between FW and ‘National Enterprise’ as identified by Makropoulos et al. [30] can be seen in  
Figure 3; a world committed to building capabilities and resources to secure a high degree of national 
self-reliance and security. In ‘National Enterprise’, Political and cultural institutions are strengthened 
to buttress national autonomy in a more fragmented world [47]—in a similar way to present day 
Switzerland [39], although increasingly like present day North Korea, Fortress India (so named due to 
its fortified borders) and others. 
Table 6. Qualitative patterns of change in Fortress World (FW) according to STEEP drivers. 
 Society Technology Economy Environment Policies 
Performance 
in FW [6] 
 
 
Worsens 
Substantially 
 
 
Relatively  
unchanged 
 
 
Weakens 
 
 
Worsens 
Substantially 
 
 
Very 
Weak 
 
 
Generic 
qualitative 
patterns of 
change that 
resonate with 
other scenario 
sets 
Focus on individuals 
Lowest public 
participation in 
governance due to its 
breakdown. Human 
wellbeing, the 
environment and 
natural resources are 
victimised to meet 
security demands. 
However, there is 
a huge increase in 
R&D for military. 
The emphasis is 
on security of 
supply and access 
to technologies is 
closely guarded. 
A weak economy 
with national 
decision making 
Disintegration of 
economic and 
social fabric 
accompanied by 
emergent 
underground 
economies. 
Highest pressure on 
natural environment. 
Increase in 
pollutants, CO2 
emissions, resource 
use/capita and water 
stress (quality and 
quantity of 
groundwater 
decrease). Net 
deforestation. 
Weakest 
social and 
environme
ntal 
policies. 
More recently NESC [31] have aligned ‘National Enterprise’ with ‘Regional Stewardship’ [65] and 
‘Order from Strength’ [54]. This was presumably related to the fact that all these scenarios include the 
requirements for ‘high regulation’ (i.e., national level policies), security and protectionism within a 
climate of fear—all of which are consistent with the descriptors of FW. Pinnegar et al. [23] recognized 
that ‘Order from Strength’ correlated well with their ‘Fortress Britain’ scenario (This scenario assumes 
that people aspire to personal independence and material wealth within a nationally-rooted cultural 
identity that gets in the way of global sustainability) in addition to UKCIP’s ‘Fortress Britain’ [66], 
‘Provincial Enterprise’ (a precursor to ‘National Enterprise’ [67]); ‘Fortress Europe’ [42] ‘A2’ and 
the Environment Agencies ‘Alpha’ scenario [27]—subsequently changed to ‘Survivor’ (EA, 2006) and 
the ‘Medium-High emissions’ scenario [68]. Whilst Landcare Associate’s ‘Fruits for a few’ (benefits 
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of global market access, communications, health protection and use of natural resources are aspects 
reserved to an elite, which also values sustainability, [28]) has been linked closely to ‘Technogarden’ 
(aligned previously with PR) reference to a dissenting and landless majority of population resonates 
also with FW (Section 2.3). Busch [26] and Kok et al. [32] confirm a number of these relationships 
(Figure 1a,b) with the addition of: ‘Scramble, Transatlantic Market and Continental Markets’  
Several additions have been made to this list based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core 
values to FW:  
 ‘Lords of Misrule’—a fortress world with socio-political backlashes and regressive 
development in institutions [49];  
 WBCSD’s ‘Rivers’ scenario—a world of ‘Haves and Have-nots’ [12];  
 ‘Turbulent neighborhoods’—a world of physical security, muscular military action and the 
formation of a fortress Europe [45];  
 ‘Boom and Blame’—a world of privileged enclaves and ghettoized communities [69]; 
  ‘Last man standing’—the way of war and competition operate in this world—globally 
disconnected, a survivalist approach [57];  
 ‘Brown Tech’—a world in which the security of the “haves” is a constant issue with gated 
communities, and apartheid style townships and barriers for the “have-nots” [70];  
 ‘Keep it local’—a society that revolves around nations feeding and providing for  
themselves [31,71]; 
The second scenario within the barbarization worlds is ‘Breakdown—B’. This archetype is the least 
well-adopted within the literature, perhaps because it is the world we would least like to consider 
possible. In addition it is likely to be a difficult scenario in which to test things (e.g., sustainability 
solutions) because it might be considered ‘too-far-gone’.  
In this variant, the vicious cycle of chaos, conflict and desperation spiral out of control. The 
security apparatus within remaining privileged areas cannot contain the tide of violence from 
disaffected individuals, terrorist organizations, ethno-religious groups, economic factions, and 
organized crime. Collapse of civil order becomes widespread, as populations become 
increasingly desperate and governments weaken. Refugees fleeing from chaotic zones destabilize 
neighboring areas, inadvertently contributing to widening waves of disorder. To stem migration, 
increasing resources are devoted to police powers, border security, and control of the activities 
of citizens. The global economic, finance and governance systems founder, though the media 
lingers to spread fresh news of upheaval. The retreat of globalization is particularly devastating 
for industrial economies highly dependent on trade and imported natural resources. The results 
are: rising unemployment, economic depression, political instability, and outbreaks of civil 
disorder, even in rich countries. This self-reinforcing chain of events eventually leads to a 
general disintegration of social, cultural, and political institutions, deindustrialization  
(to varying degrees in different regions), and in many regions a return to semi-tribal or feudal 
societal structures. With the collapse of markets and investment generally, technological 
progress halts—and the level of technological capability regresses. Population eventually begins 
to decrease as mortality rates surge with economic collapse and environmental degradation. 
Many couples, deeply pessimistic about the future, choose not to bring children into the world. In 
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a bitter irony, equity increases but only because everybody gets poorer. Breakdown conditions 
could persist for many decades before social evolution to higher levels of civilization again 
becomes possible [8]. 
Raskin [21] first suggested that this scenario was broadly similar to:  
 IPCC’s ‘A2’ scenario [16]—a fragmented unsustainable world. It is interesting to note that 
Raskin does not align ‘A2’ with FW and yet this shows that incredible similarities do exist.  
‘Diamonds’ [61] and ‘Decline to disaster’ [72] have been added to the list due to their reference to 
devastation of ecosystems and a triple bottom line in tatters, which includes: global economic 
depression, crippling energy shortages, local and regional wars, rampant terrorism, crime, corruption 
and more.  
3. Discussion 
This research has shown that, based upon the descriptions given within their scenario narratives, 
seemingly disparate visions of the future can be aligned under the three world end-states and six 
scenario variants first proposed by GSG. In some cases the similarities are not surprising given that the 
work derives directly from, or links to, GSG. For example, the AEO—African Environmental Outlook 
scenarios [25] were developed using the rich narratives from four of the GSG scenarios (PR, MF, NSP, 
FW) combined with IPCC emissions data [16], and in the case of Global Environment  
Outlook [17,18] the GSG actors were directly involved [73]. In other cases, the adoption of a similar 
methodological approach or adoption of identical ‘key drivers’ leads to unavoidable similarities. For 
example, Makropoulos and colleagues [30] developed seven water-based scenarios that directly 
references GSG’s work [9,10] and that of Schilling [74]. What is most reassuring is that, whatever the 
methodological framework adopted a significant number of scenario variants developed by a range of 
authors all align to the three world states and six visions derived by GSG; in this paper >150 scenarios 
have been aligned with the GSG scenarios based solely on information provided in their  
narratives (Table 7). Based on these findings, this discussion section considers whether the archetypal 
set of scenarios first proposed by GSG might be deemed appropriate for adoption by research 
institutions wishing to test against existing scenarios, rather than to derive, refine and test for internal 
consistency yet another scenario set. 
3.1. Archetypes: Are the Three World End-States Proposed by GSG Appropriate?  
In 1998 Hammond based the title of his book ‘Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century’ [11] 
on the results of the 2050 project (a joint venture between the Brookings Institution, the Sante Fe 
Institute and the World Resources Institute—of which Hammond was director) and in line with GSG 
investigated three possible world end-states (Market, Transformed and Fortress) within seven 
continents. The three worlds suggested by Hammond map directly onto the four GSG archetypes 
derived by Gallopin et al. [8] and adopted by Raskin [21] (not surprising given that Hammond was 
part of the GSG team).  
Van Asselt et al. [4] subsequently suggested four scenario archetypes based on their key combining 
elements: ‘Think Green’—Environmental protection; ‘Money maker—high economic growth;  
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‘Wait and See’—limited policy action, and ‘Doom Monger’—a pessimistic outlook. The link with 
GSG archetypes is self-evident and is not dissimilar to the four archetypal classifications (based upon 
10 scenario sets—40 scenarios) presented by Wilson [75]; ‘Market dominance’; ‘Global Institutional 
Governance’; ‘Fortress against the storms’, and ‘People power’.  
Figure 5 shows a family tree of scenario archetypes as presented by Tibbs [76] in which it is 
particularly easy to identify the GSG archetypes. Moreover, it illustrates how archetypes are related 
and identifies phases likely required to pass through before reaching the different worlds—something 
previously well recognized by GSG [8].  
Morita et al. [36] grouped 124 scenarios from 48 sources (derived from 1980–1999) 43 of which 
pre-dated the work of GSG, according to demographic, socio-economic, technological and 
environmental dimensions (Table 7). It was recognized by Morita and colleagues that three archetypes 
matched closely those first proposed by GSG.  
In 2009, Natural England considered 35 different scenarios from the literature where land-use had 
been considered, and suggested the emergence of five archetypes (Figure 4 and Table 8, [32]). The 
similarity between these archetypes and those suggested by Hammond [11] and GSG are self-evident 
(Table 1). Except, for ‘business as usual’, which has confusing connotations and this is something that 
the GSG have previously adopted and subsequently replaced with ‘Conventional worlds’.  
Whilst Tibbs [76], Morita [36] and NESC [32] present an archetypal set related to ‘Technology’ 
alone, it could be argued, that it is perhaps not required, as the technology driver cannot be divorced 
from the other archetypes, for example, GSG assigns PR and NSP the best technologies (Figures 5  
and 7) and technologies are already heavily embedded within ‘Paradigm shifts’.  
Figure 5. Scenario archetype family tree. (Modified from Tibbs [76], to show location of 
GSG scenarios). 
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Table 7. Scenario archetypes, adapted from [36]. 
Archetypes 
 
Scenario Sub-Group : [7,8,9,10,12,13,16,21 and 84—126]  Those 
highlighted in bold are also included in Table 2 
No 
Scenarios 
Link to 
GSG 
‘Current 
Trends’ 
Conventional: no significant change and/or continuation of current trends 
High Growth: government facilitates business, leading to prosperity 
Asia Shift: economic power shifts from the West to Asia 
Economy Paramount: emphasis on economic values deterioration in 
environmental and social conditions  
12 
14 
5 
9 
MF, PR 
‘Sustainable 
Development” 
Our common Future: increased economic activity is made consistent with 
improved equity and environmental quality 
Low consumption: conscious shift from consumerism 
21 
 
16 
NSP, EC 
‘Pessimistic’ 
Breakdown: Collapse of Human Society 
Fractured World: Deterioration into antagonistic regional blocs 
Chaos: Instability and Disorder 
Conservative: World economic crash is succeeded by risk-averse regime 
5 
9 
4 
2 
FW, B 
‘High-Tech 
Optimist’ 
Cybertopia: information and communication technology facilitate 
individualistic, diverse and innovative world 
Technotopia: technology solves most of humanity’s problems 
16 
 
5 
- 
Table 8. Scenario archetypes, adapted from [31]. 
Archetypes Details (refer also to Figure 3) Link to GSG 
‘Business as usual’ A world that prioritizes government and the economy. MF 
‘Sustainability‘ 
A world that prioritizes the environment - through efficiencies of scale in 
urban settings, or through decentralization and focus on communities and 
locales. 
PR, NSP 
‘Paradigm shifts’ 
A world where current assumptions about future governance or the 
economy are overturned. They are often connected to worldview and value 
shifts that are enabled by new technologies. 
EC 
‘Collapse 
(vulnerability)‘ 
A world with economic difficulties, social schisms  
and/or environmental degradation. 
FW 
‘Technological Age’ A ‘high tech’ world transformed primarily by technological fixes. - 
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Table 9. Scenario archetypes, adapted from [32]. 
Archetypes Details (refer also to Figure 1a) Link to GSG 
‘The Global 
Market’ 
Global developments steered by economic growth result in a total dominance of 
international markets with a low degree of regulation. Environmental problems 
are being dealt with when solutions are economically interesting 
MF 
‘Global 
Sustainability’ 
A globalized world with an increasingly proactive attitude of policy-makers and 
the public at large towards environmental issues and a high level of regulation. 
Three main variations can be discerned. One where the global solution is 
technology change, one with strong governance structures and one with a 
broadly supported paradigm shift. 
PR, NSP 
‘Regional 
Sustainability’ 
A regionalized world, where most—broadly supported initiatives improve the 
state of the environment and move toward sustainable solutions are bottom-up 
with a major role for NGOs and multi-level governance structures 
EC 
‘Continental 
Barriers’ 
A regionalized world based on economic development. The market mechanism 
fails, leading to a growing gap between rich and poor. In turn, this results in 
increasing problems with crime, violence and terrorism, which eventuates in 
strong trade and other barriers 
FW 
We already live in a technological age—what is distinctively important is what pulls or pushes the 
technological adoption to occur, and how this might be intertwined with user-behavior (Section 3.3). 
This is remiss in other scenario sets and something on which the GSG scenario variants provide 
significant clarity. Notwithstanding this observation, similar adoption has occurred within the water 
engineering field (e.g., Macropoulos et al. [30]) which is not surprising given that technology is 
considered to be a key driver.  
Kok et al. [32] highlighted the practical implications for being able to link scenarios and use 
additional information from other studies provided that scenarios could be categorized in a similar 
structure. The difficulty here is ensuring that internal consistency is assured whilst characteristics are 
being cherry picked. Table 9 was created for the CLIMSAVE scenarios project, based on the similarities 
found between scenarios (Figure 1a). Once again the match to GSG archetypes is very strong. 
Therefore it appears that the three world end-states proposed by GSG are sufficiently diverse, 
distinct, clearly defined, well-grounded, defendable, and wholly appropriate including key world drivers 
(social, technological, economic, environmental, political, organizational, and security) that are as 
relevant today as they were some 16 years ago. Moreover, if data from Morita [36] are included it 
might be suggested that there is >30 years worth of evidence to back up GSGs scenario archetypes.  
As such user buy-in is achieved easily, as evidenced by the critical acclaim of Hammonds’ book [127] 
and the significant global citations of GSG’s work within the scenarios literature.  
3.2. Scenario Variants: Are Six Variants Appropriate? 
In general, practitioners recommend that two scenarios be considered the minimum (one is too 
easily mistaken for a forecast) and four scenarios appear to be the maximum number for easy audience 
engagement while still allowing for depth and rigor of analysis [128]. In many cases when tasked with 
getting an audience to imagine a different scenario to their place of reference, it is not inappropriate to 
assume that the audience are likely to draw from images of places that may not conform to their sense 
of normality and yet, albeit subconsciously, are related to something they have seen, or heard of, in 
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other parts of the world. This may be the underlying reason why MF, PR, NSP and FW scenarios work 
so well and have been so well-adopted within the literature even when derived in seemingly different 
ways—credibility is gained because people can imagine living there. In this context this is not 
necessarily an end-state, i.e., it is some manageable time period, not some vague and static point. That 
said, the use of a national tagging (e.g., assuming the UK is a PR world and the USA is a MF world) 
could be misleading as it very much depends upon the scale being considered. For example, at the 
national scale, the UK might be assumed to align with the characteristics used to define PR and yet 
glimpses of each of the different world-end states may be evident nationally (the next county) or 
locally (i.e., the next street or the next house). 
It is interesting to see that ‘Breakdown—B’ scenario is less-well adopted within the literature (only 
three of the scenarios assessed here align with Breakdown), and whilst a narrative was developed by 
GSG, detailed numerical analysis was not considered. This perhaps reinforces the notion that this 
marginalized world end-state variation is less useful analytically than FW, where the premise is to 
avoid the immediate threat of Breakdown. Therefore, it is not surprising that authors align it closely 
with FW using two ‘axes of uncertainty’ (Figure 1). However, it could be argued that breakdown can 
occur at any point in time from any scenario, exampled in the 1990’s by the LA riots (MF 
breakdown?) or in 2011 by the UK riots (PR Breakdown?) and the overriding goal in these cases is to 
restore democracy. Whilst ‘Eco-communalism—EC’ is well-adopted within the literature, it once again 
was not explored by GSG with detailed numerical analysis. According to Raskin [129], this is because 
GSG didn't want to emphasize a scenario it felt to be implausible in light of soaring cross-border 
interdependence (except as an offshoot, perhaps, of other scenarios). Raskin suggests that the EC/NSP 
distinction is "clear-cut"; in NSP, the extension of human identity to embrace global citizenship 
becomes the foundation for the construction of supra-national institutions for effectively addressing 
supra-national challenges and pursuing opportunities (i.e., some degree of nation-state sovereignty is 
ceded to global governance). In EC, state sovereignty is challenged, but in a localizing direction. 
Therefore quantification would have been (and still is) straightforward [129]. 
3.3. Can GSG Scenarios be Used with an ‘Axes of Uncertainty’ Approach? 
Many of the UK scenarios reported here (including OST) adopt an ‘axes of uncertainty’ approach 
(Figure 1 to 3) as distinct from the ‘key drivers’ approach used by GSG (Section 2). It is a testament to 
the flexibility and applicability of the GSG scenarios that they can be mapped accordingly and yet still 
keep the necessary divergence that allows for meaningful research-based (sensitivity-type) analysis 
within a controlled system boundary (Figure 3). The placement of the scenarios (or the size of the 
containing bubble) within any of these grid like structures is not exact, and will be, to some extent, 
subject to judgment. Moreover it is important to appreciate certain caveats; scenarios may be located 
within the same quadrant and share an archetypal vision, but not be identical; that is, they will more 
than likely have subtle variations within characteristic sub-sets. Notwithstanding this shortfall, for 
research purposes the process of plotting GSG against any existing (or new) set of axes facilitates 
identifying similarities between scenario variants and can be used to identify potential research areas 
for further interrogation.  
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For example, in Figure 6 the four GSG scenarios (MF, FW, NSP and PR) are mapped against two 
key drivers (SOCIAL—user behavior and TECHNOLOGICAL—technological efficiency). The 
mapping process reveals a level of detail within the GSG scenarios that makes them rather unique 
amongst others found within the scenarios literature. First, technological efficiency and behavior 
adoption in each scenario is diverse and yet can be traced back to a single driving force within the 
scenario (i.e., that which pushes or pulls a change to occur). For example, in PR and NSP it is evident 
that both adopt high levels of sustainable technological efficiency; however, in PR, changes are pushed 
through policy impacting very little on changing user behavior (which, it could be argued, is not 
altered for the better or constrained from getting worse). In many respects this matches directly the 
approach being taken within the Code for Sustainable Homes in the UK, which might be considered as 
weak, medium and strong forms of PR, where B represents the baseline of where we are now,  
and 1 (least sustainable) to 6 (most sustainable) represents the various levels of the Code. This 
compatibility is extremely important when making scenarios directly relevant to current National 
policy makers and stakeholders. Conversely, in NSP individuals’ willingness to change their behavior 
(to be more sustainable) is the pulling force which requires adoption of more higher efficiency 
technologies; whilst policy facilitates this action, it is not required as a stimulus to effect change. 
Sustainability performance is based on voluntary reduced demand performance (e.g., 80 liters per 
person per day of water or zero heating requirements in homes). What is most interesting is that the 
performance of NSP could match exactly that achieved in FWHN (i.e., for those that have-not) but for 
completely different reasons. The push in FWHN is lack of available resources (perhaps rationing) that 
demands a significant step-change in behavior; likewise, the push in FWH is security of supply. In MF, 
the pull is peoples’ growing demand, which in this world must be met and the push is an expanding 
economy where more goods are made widely available. 
Figure 6. Four GSG scenarios mapped onto technological efficiency and user behavior 
axes (B is baseline, 1–6 represent various Levels of Code for Sustainable Homes). 
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4. Conclusions 
In summary the GSG scenarios are credible, internally consistent, thought-provoking (i.e., within 
and outside ones comfort zone) and carry a pedigree that can be traced back over 20 years. In addition, 
having evaluated the various mapping exercises undertaken within the literature, this present research 
suggests that a significant number (>150) of scenarios since 1997 can be mapped to the original 
archetypes derived by the GSG (this increases to almost >280 if the timeframe is increased to 1980). 
The greatest advantage of the GSG approach is that the world end-states can be mapped onto any set of 
axes (thereby facilitating detailed interrogation) resulting in scenarios within each quadrant (a key 
requirement for meaningful futures sensitivity analysis); this is testament to the original conception of 
the GSG scenarios and their subsequent refinement over a 16 year period. Moreover the scenarios are 
highly dramatized, showing a deep understanding of the key fundamental drivers of change. The most 
relevant scenarios for UK-based research appear to be MF, PR, NSP and FW, although it should be 
recognized that the level of refinement within narratives will be directly related to the scale of adoption 
(i.e., national vs. local). Therefore further work is required to quantify the relevant (sustainability) 
indicators within scenarios; this is the focus of future UF research publications.  
Acknowledgments 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this work provided by the UK’s 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) under grant EP/F007426/1. 
Conflict of Interest 
The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
References  
1. Kahn, H. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios; Praeger: New York, NY, USA, 1986. 
2. Schwartz, P. The Art of the Long View; Doubleday: New York, NY, USA, 1991. 
3. Van der Heijden, K. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation and The Sixth Sense;  
John Wiley and Sons: NY, USA, 1997. 
4. Van Asselt, M.B.A.; de Niet, R.; Peters, S.S.M.; Rijkens-Klomp, N.; Rotmans, J.; Slooff, W. 
Towards Visions for a Sustainable Europe: An Overview and Assessment of the Last Decade of 
European Scenario-studies; ICIS: Maastricht, The Netherlands, 1998. 
5. Hunt, D.V.L.; Lombardi, D.R.; Atkinson, S.; Barber, A.; Barnes, M.; Boyko, C.T.; Brown, J.; 
Bryson, J.; Butler, D.; Caputo, S.; et al. Using Scenarios to Explore Urban UK Futures: A 
Review of Futures Literature from 1997 to 2011; Working Document, 2012. 
6. Electris, C.; Raskin, P.; Rosen, R.; Stultz, J. The Century Ahead: Four Global Scenarios; 
Technical Documentation: Tellus Institute: Boston, MA, USA, 2009. 
7. Kemp-Benedict, E.; Heaps, C.; Raskin, P. Global Scenario Group Futures: Technical Notes; 
Polestar Series Report Number 9; Stockholm Environment Institute: Stockholm, Sweden, 2002. 
Sustainability 2012, 4 766 
 
 
8. Gallopin, G.C.; Hammond, A.; Raskin, P.; Swart, R. Branch Points: Global Scenarios and 
Human Choice. A Resource Paper of the Global Scenario Group; PoleStar Series Report Number 
7; Stockholm Environment Institute: Stockholm, Sweden, 1997. 
9. Raskin, P.; Banuri, T.; Gallopín, G.; Gutman, P.; Hammond, A.L.; Kates, R.; Swart, R.  
Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead; Stockholm Environmental Institute: 
MA, USA, 2002. 
10. Raskin, P.; Gallopín, G.; Gutman, P.; Hammond, A.L.; Swart, R. Bending the Curve: Toward 
Global Sustainability; Stockholm Environmental Institute: MA, USA, 1997. 
11. Hammond, A.H. Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century; Island Press: IL, USA, 1998. 
12. WBCSD. Exploring Sustainable Development: Global Scenarios 2000–2050, Summary Brochure; 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development: Geneva, Switzerland, 1997. 
13. OECD. The World in 2020: Towards a New Global Age; Organisation for Economic 
Development and Cooperation: Paris, France, 1997. 
14. OECD. Environment Outlook; Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation: Paris, 
France, 2001. 
15. OECD. Environmental Outlook to 2030; Environment & Sustainable Development, Organisation 
for Economic Development and Cooperation: Tehran, Iran, 2008; Volume 1. 
16. IPCC. Emissions Scenarios: Summary for Policy Makers. In Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change); Nakicenovic, N., Ed.; Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, England, 2000; pp. 3–12. 
17. UNEP. Global Environment Outlook 3; United Nations Environment Programme: Nairobi, 
Kenya, 2002. Available online: www.unep.org/geo/geo3/ (accessed on 03 September 2011). 
18. UNEP. Global Environment Outlook 4; United Nations Environment Programme: Nairobi, 
Kenya, 2007. 
19. Gallopin, G.C.; Rijsberman, F. Three global water scenarios. Int. J. Water 1997, 1, 16–40. 
20. WWV. World Water Vision Commission Report 2000. A Water Secure World: Vision for Water, 
Life and the Environment; Earthscan: London, UK. 2000. Available online: 
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/Publications_and_reports/Visions/Co
mmissionReport.pdf (accessed on April 2012). 
21. Raskin, P. Global Scenarios in Historical Perspective. In Ecosystems and Human Well-being 
Scenarios; Island Press: IL, USA, 2005; Volume 2, pp. 35–44.  
22. Pridmore, A.; Bristow, A.; May, T.; Tight, M. Climate Change, Impacts, Future Scenarios and 
the role of Transport; Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Norwich, UK, 2003. 
23. Pinnegar, J.K.; Viner, D.; Hadley, D.; Dye, S.; Harris, M.; Berkout, F.; Simpson, M.  
Alternative Future Scenarios for Marine Ecosystems (AFMEC); Technical Report; Cefas: 
Lowestoft, Suffolk, UK, 2006. 
24. De Vries, B.J.M. Scenarios: Guidance for an Uncertain and Complex World? In Sustainability or 
Collapse? An Integrated History and Future of People on Earth; Costanza, D., Graumlich, L., 
Steffen, W., Eds.; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2005; pp. 379–397. 
25. Ochola, M.C.; Abdelrehim, A.; Ayugi, P.J.; Ayeni, B.; Asamoah, J.; Gowa, E.; Roberts, J.  
Africa Environment Outlook 2; United Nations Environment Programme: Washington, DC, USA, 
2006; pp. 412–480. 
Sustainability 2012, 4 767 
 
 
26. Busch, G. Future European agricultural Landscapes—What can we learn from existing quatitative 
land use scenarios studies? Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 2006, 114, 121–140. 
27. EA. Water Resources for the Future: A Strategy for England and Wales; UK Environment 
Agency: Bristol, UK, 2001. 
28. Taylor, R.; Frame, B.; Delaney, K.; Brignall-Theyer, M. Four Future Scenarios for New Zealand: 
Work in Progress, 2nd ed.; Manaaki Whenua Press: Lincoln, New Zealand, 2007. 
29. Rothman, D.S. A Survey of Environmental Scenarios. In Environmental Futures: The Practice of 
Environmental Scenario Analysis. Developments in Integrated Environmental Assessment—
Volume 2; Alcamo, J., Ed.; Elsevier: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2008; pp. 37–65. 
30. Makropoulos, C.; Memon, F.A.; Shirley-Smith, C.; Butler, D. Futures: An exploration of 
scenarios for sustainable urban water management. Water Policy 2009, 10, 345–373. 
31. NESC. Natural England Scenario Compendium; Natural England Commissioned Report 
NECR031; Natural England Reports: Bristol, UK, 2009; p. 115. 
32. Kok, K.; Gramberger, M.; Karl-Heinz, S.; Jager, J.; Omann, I. Report on the New Methodology 
for Scenario Analysis, Including Guidelines for Its Implementation, and Based on an Analysis of 
Past Scenario Exercises. The CLIMSAVE Project, 2011. Available online: 
http://www.climsave.eu (accessed on April 2012). 
33. Raskin, P.D.; Electris, C.; Rosen, R.A. The century ahead: Searching for sustainability. 
Sustainability 2010, 2, 2626–2651.  
34. Kämäri, J.; Alcamo, J.; Bärlund, I.; Duel, H.; Farquharson, F.; Flörke, M.; Fry, M.;  
Houghton-Carr, H.; Kabat, P.; Kaljonen, M.; et al. Envisioning the future of water in Europe—
The SCENES project. E-Water 2008, pp. 1–28. 
35. Duel, H.; Meijer, K.; Loos, L.; Kämär, J. SCENES: Exploring the European Water Futures. In 
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: 
Reducing Water-Related Risks in Europe, Brussels, Belgium, 6–7 July 2010. 
36. Morita, T.; Robinson, J.; Adegbulugbe, A.; Alcamo, J.; Herbert, D.; Lebre, E.; Nakicenovic, N.; 
Pitcher, H.; Raskin, P.; Riahi, K.; et al. Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation Scenarios and 
Implications. In Climate Change 2001: Mitigation; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 
2001; pp. 115–166. 
37. Zurek, M.B. A Short Review of Global Scenarios for Food Systems Analysis; GECAFS Working 
Paper 1; GECAFS International Project Office: Wallingford, UK, 2006. 
38. Westhoek, H.J.; van den Berg, M.; Bakkes, J.A. Scenario development to explore the future of 
Europe’s rural areas. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 2006, 114, 7–20. 
39. Sami. The Future of Services to the Public; Saint Andrews Management Institute: St Andrews, 
UK, 2007. 
40. Foresight. Environmental Futures; Office of Science and Technology, Department of Trade and 
Industry: London, UK, 1999. 
41. OST. Foresight Futures 2020: Revised Scenarios and Guidance; Office of Science & 
Technology, Department for Trade & Industry: London, UK, 2002. Available online: 
www.foresight.gov.uk (accessed on 07 July 2011). 
Sustainability 2012, 4 768 
 
 
42. PMSU. Net Benefits: A Sustainable and Profitable Future for UK Fishing; Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office: London, UK, 2004. Available online: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/ria.pdf (accessed on  
April 2012). 
43. Defra. WR0104: Lifestyle Scenarios: The Futures for Waste Composition; Summary Report; A 
project for Defra’s WREP: Brook Lyndhurst, London, UK, 2007. 
44. Keith, A.; O’Brien, R.; Prest, M. The Future of the Global Economy to 2030; Outsights Ltd: 
London, UK, 2008. 
45. Bertrand, G.; Michalski, A.; Pench, L.R. Scenarios Europe 2010: Five Possible Futures for 
Europe; Working Paper; European Commission, Forward Studies Unit, 1999. 
46. SEEDA. Taking Stock: Managing Our Impact. An Ecological Footprint of the South East Region; 
South East England Development Agency: London, England, 2003. 
47. OST. Foresight—Drugs Futures 2025: The Scenarios; Office of Science and Technology: 
Outsights Ltd: London, UK, 2005. 
48. Steedman, P.; Schultz, W. Future Scenarios for the UK Food System. A Toolkit for Thinking 
Ahead; Food Ethics Council: Brighton, UK, 2009. 
49. Ratcliffe, J. Imagineering global real estate: A property foresight exercise. Foresight 2001, 3, 
453–475. 
50. Hulme, M.; Jenkins, G.L.; Lu, X.; Turnpenny, J.R.; Mitchell, T.D.; Jones, R.G.; Lowe, J.; 
Murphy, J.M.; Hassell, D.; Boorman, P.; et al. Climate Change Scenarios for the United 
Kingdom: The UKCIP02 Scientific Report, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School 
of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia: Norwich, UK, 2002. 
51. EA. Exploring the Future: Guidance Toolkit for Using Environment Agency Scenarios 2030; 
Science Report: SC050002/SR2, UK Environment Agency, Bristol, UK, 2006. 
52. EA. Demand for water in the 2050’s; Briefing Note: UK Environment Agency, Bristol, UK, 
2010. 
53. Raskin, P. World Lines: A framework for exploring global pathways. Ecol. Econ. 2008, 65,  
461–470. 
54. MEA. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Scenarios; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: 
Island Press: IL, USA, 2005; Volume 2. 
55. Go-Science. Land Use Futures: Making the Most of Land Use in the 21st Century;  
The Government Office for Science: London, UK, 2010. 
56. UKWIR. 21st Century Distribution Networks; UK Water Industry Research Limited: London, 
UK, 2010. 
57. Heinberg, R. Powerdown: Options and Actions for a Post Carbon World; New Society 
Publishers: Gabriola, Canada, 2003. 
58. ERAG. Energy Systems in 2050 Energy Review: Working Paper; Advisory Group, Cabinet Office 
Performance and Innovation Unit, 2001. 
59. Evans, E.P.; Ashely, R.; Hall, J.; Penning-Rowsell, E.C.; Sayers, P.; Thorne, C.; And Watkinson, 
A. Foresight Future Flooding, Volume I and Volume II. Office of Science and Technology, 
London, 2004.  
Sustainability 2012, 4 769 
 
 
60. Evans, E.P.; Simm, J.D.; Thorne, C.R.; Arnell, N.W.; Ashley, R.M.; Hess, T.M.; Lane, S.N.; 
Morris, J.; Nicholls, R.J.; Penning-Rowsell, E.C.; et al. An Update of the Foresight Future 
Flooding 2004 Qualitative Risk Analysis; Cabinet Office: London, UK, 2008. 
61. SA. Raising Our Game: Can We Sustain Global Civilization? SustainAbility: London, UK, 2007. 
62. CA. The State of the Countryside, 2020; The Countryside Agency: West Yorkshire, UK, 2003. 
63. Raskin, P. The Great Transition Today: A Report from the Future; GTI Paper Series;  
Tellus Institute: Boston, MA, USA, 2006. 
64. Huntington, S.P. The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs 1993, 72, 2–49. 
65. HFP. Futures Working Group; Workshop Report. Kings College, London, UK. 12 October 2007. 
66. UKCIP. Socio-Economic Scenarios for Climate Change Impact Assessment: A Guide to Their 
Use in the UK Climate Impacts Programme; UKCIP: Oxford, UK, 2001. 
67. Watson, J.; Tetteh, A.; Dutton, G.; Bristow, A.; Kelly, C.; Page, M. UK Hydrogen Futures to 
2050; Working Paper 46: Tyndal Centre for Climate Change Research, , Norwich, UK , 2004. 
68. Berkhout, F.; Hertin, J. Foresight futures scenarios: Developing and applying a participative 
Strategic Planning tool. GMI 2003, 37, 37–52. 
69. HSE. HSE futures Scenario Building: The Future of Health and Safety in 2017; Research Report 
RR600; Health and Safety Executive: Bootle, UK, 2007. 
70. Holmgren, D. Future Scenarios: How Communities Can Adapt to Peak Oil and Climate Change; 
Chelsea Green Publishing: Vancouver, Canada, 2009. 
71. NERR. England’s Natural Environment in 2060—Issues, Implications and Scenarios; Research 
Report NERR031: Natural England Reports: Bristol, UK, 2009. 
72. Hala, W.E.; Marien, M. Global megacrisis: Four scenarios, two perspectives. Futurist 2011,  
26–33. 
73. Raskin, P.; Kamp-Benedict, E. Global Environmental Outlook Scenario Framework; Background 
paper for UNEPS third Global Environmental Outlook Report (GEO-3); Stockholm 
Environmental Institute: Stockholm, Sweden, 2004. 
74. Schilling, W. Urban Drainage: Quo Wadis. In Proceedings of the XXX IAHR Conference 
(International Association of Hydraulic Engineering and Research), Thessaloniki, Greece, 
August, 2003. 
75. Wilson, P. Africa in the Global Scenarios. In Africa 2025: Launching Africa’s Long-Term 
Perspective Study; Sall, A., Mureithi, L., Eds.; African Futures: Midrand, South Africa, 1999;  
pp. 51–69. 
76. Tibbs, H. Sustainability. Deep. News 1999, 10, 1–71. 
77. EEA. Land-Use Scenarios for Europe: Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis on a European 
scale. EEA Technical report No 9, EEA, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2007. 
78. EURuralis. EURuralis 1.0 A Scenario Study on Europe’s Rural Areas to Support Policy 
Discussion [CD-ROM]; Alterra: Wageningen, The Netherlands, 2004. 
79. IAG. Long-Term Reductions in Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the UK; Inter-departmental 
Analysts Group, 2002. Available online: www.berr.gov.uk/files/file38187.pdf  
(accessed on 30 August 2010). 
80. Mooij, R.; Tang, P. Four Futures of Europe; CPB: Den Haag, The Netherlands, 2003. 
Sustainability 2012, 4 770 
 
 
81. PIU. The Energy Review; The Policy and Innovation Unit: The Cabinet Office: London, UK, 
2002. 
82. Shell. Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050; Shell International BV: Den Haag, The Netherlands, 2008. 
83. UKCES. Horizon Scanning and Scenario Building: Scenario for Skills 2020: A Report for the 
National Strategic Skills Audit for England 2010; Evidence Report 17; UK Commission for 
Employment and Skills, London, UK, 2010.  
84. Barney, G.O. Global 2000 Revisited: What Shall We Do? The Critical Issues of the 21st Century; 
Millennium Institute: Arlington, VA, USA, 1993. 
85. Bossel, H. Earth at a Crossroads: Paths to a Sustainable Future; Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, UK, 1998. 
86. Coates, J.F.; Jarratt, J. What Futurists Believe: Agreements and Disagreements; World Future 
Society: Bethesda, MD, USA, 1990; Volume 14. 
87. Coates, J.F. Factors Shaping and Shaped by the Environment: 1990–2010. Futur. Res. Q. 1991, 7, 
5–55. 
88. Coates, J.F. Long-term technological trends and their implications for management.  
Int. J. Technol. Manag. 1997, 14, 579–595. 
89. Cornish, E. 92 Ways Our Lives Will Change by the Year 2025; The World Future Society: 
Bethesda, MD, USA, 1996; Volume 30. 
90. Costanza, R. Four visions of the century ahead: Will it be star trek, Ecotopia, big government or 
mad max? Futurist 1999, 33, 23–29. 
91. CPB. Scanning the Future: A Long-Term Scenario Study of the World Economy 1990–2015; 
SDU Publishers: Den Haag, The Netherlands, 1992. 
92. Duchin, F.; Lange, G.-M.; Thonstad, K.; Idenburg, A. The Future of the Environment: Ecological 
Economics and Technological Change; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 1994. 
93. GBN. Twenty-First Century Organizations: Four Plausible Prospects; GBN: Emeryville, CA, 
USA, 1996. 
94. Glenn, J.C.; Gordon, T.J. 1997 State of the Future: Implications for Action Today; American 
Council for the United Nations University: Washington, DC, USA, 1997. 
95. Glenn, J.C.; Gordon, T.J. 1998 State of the Future: Issues and Opportunities; American Council 
for the United Nations University: Washington, DC, USA, 1998. 
96. Henderson, H. Looking Back from the 21st Century. Futur. Res. Q. 1997, 13, 83–98. 
97. Hughes, B.B. Rough Road Ahead: Global Transformations in the 21st Century. Futur. Res. Q. 
1997, 13, 83–107. 
98. IDEA (Innovators of Digital Economy Alternatives) Team. Creating the Future: Scenarios for 
the Digital Economy; Simon Fraser University: Vancouver, Canada, 1996. 
99. Kahane, A. Scenarios for energy: Sustainable world vs. global mercantilism. Long Range Plan 
1992, 25, 38–46. 
100. Kinsman, F. Millennium: Towards Tomorrow’s Society; W. H. Allen: London, UK, 1990. 
101. Linden, E. The Future in Plain Sight: Nine Clues to the Coming Instability; Simon & Schuster: 
New York, NY, USA, 1998. 
102. McRae, H. The World in 2020: Power, Culture and Prosperity; HarperCollins Publishers: 
London, UK, 1994. 
Sustainability 2012, 4 771 
 
 
103. Meadows, D.H.; Meadows, D.L.; Randers, J. Beyond the Limits; Chelsea Green Publishing 
Company: Post Mills, VT, USA, 1992. 
104. Mercer, D. Future Revolutions: A Comprehensive Guide to the Third Millennium; Orion Business 
Books: London, UK, 1998. 
105. Millennium Project. American Council for the United Nations University 1997. Available online: 
http://www.millenniumproject.org/millennium/scenarios/index.html (accessed on 17 July 2011). 
106. Nakicenovic, N.; Grubler, A.; McDonald, A. Global Energy Perspectives; Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, UK, 1998. 
107. Olson, R.L. Alternative images of a sustainable future. Futures 1994, 26, 156–169. 
108. Price, D. Energy and human evolution. Popul. Environ. 1995, 16, 301–319. 
109. Ramphal, S. Our Country, the Planet: Forging a Partnership for Survival; Island Press: 
Washington, DC, USA, 1992. 
110. Repetto, R. The Global Possible; Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, USA, 1985. 
111. Rotmans, J.; de Vries, H.J.M. Perspectives on Global Change: The TARGETS Approach; 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1997. 
112. Rotmans, J.; van Asselt, M.B.A.; Anastasi, C.; Greeuw, S.C.H.; Mellors, J.; Peters, S.;  
Rothman, D.S.; Rijkens-Klomp, N. Visions for a sustainable Europe. Futures 2000, 32, 809–831. 
113. Schindler, C.; Lapid, G. The Great Turning: Personal Peace, Global Victory; Bear & Company 
Publishing: Santa Fe, NM, USA, 1989. 
114. Schwartz, P. The new world disorder. Wired 1995, 3, 104–107. 
115. Schwartz, P.; Leyden, P. The long boom: A history of the future 1980–2020. Wired 1997, 5, 115–
131. 
116. Science Advisory Board (SAB). Beyond the Horizon: Using Foresight to Protect the 
Environmental Future; Report No. EPA-SAB-EC-95-007/007A; Science Advisory Board, US 
EPA: Washington, DC, USA, 1995.  
117. Shinn, R.L. Forced Options: Social Decisions for the 21st Century; Harper & Row Publishers: 
San Francisco, CA, USA, 1982. 
118. Stokke, P.R.; Boyce, T.A.; Ralston, W.K.; Wilson, I.H. Visioning (and preparing for) the future: 
The introduction of scenarios-based planning into Statoil. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 1991, 
40, 131–150. 
119. Sunter, C. The New Century: Quest for the High Road; Human and Rousseau (Pty) Ltd./Tafelberg 
Publishers Ltd: Cape Town, South Africa, 1992. 
120. Svedin, U.; Aniansson, B. Surprising Futures: Notes from an International Workshop on  
Long-Term World Development; Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research; 
Friibergh Manor, Sweden, 1987. 
121. Toffler, A. The Third Wavel Morrow: New York, NY, USA, 1980. 
122. Van den Bergh, M. Charting a Course: Preparing for the Oil and Gas Business of the 21st 
Century. Speech presented at the State University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands, 
1996. 
123. Wallerstein, I. The Capitalist World Economy—Middle-Run Prospects. Alternatives: Social 
Transformation and Humane Governance 1989, 14, 279–288. 
Sustainability 2012, 4 772 
 
 
124. Wilkinson, L. How to Build Scenarios. Wired; Conde Nast Publications: San Francisco, CA, 
USA, 1995; pp. 74–81. 
125. World Bank. World Development Report 1995—Workers in an Integrating World; World Bank: 
Washington, DC, USA, 1995. 
126. WRI. The Transition to a Sustainable Society; World Resources Institute: Washington, DC, USA, 
1991. 
127. Kai, N. Review: Which world? Scenarios for the 21st century. Environ. Sci. Policy Sustain. Dev. 
1998, 40, 25–26. 
128. Stout, D. The Use of Scenarios in Foresight 1994—1999. An Information Document Prepared for 
the OST. Office of Science and Technology, 2002. Available online: www.foresight.gov.uk 
(accessed on 18 July 2011). 
129. Raskin, P. Personnel communication, 2011. 
© 2012 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). 
